The recent central
government budget for 2009-10 has received more than the usual interest
amongst the media and academic circles, both before and after its
presentation, essentially because of the extraordinary economic situation
faced by the country in the face of the unprecedented global financial and
economic turmoil. The unusual expectations generated in the minds of the
public at large from the central budget have had a wider context, that is,
the budget was sought to be providing answers to a wide variety of
questions that have surfaced due to the confluence of a number of
developments.
First, the high growth
phase of four years 2004-05 to 2007-08 particularly of manufacturing, was
brought to a precipitate halt in early 2008 following the sledge-hammer
kind of monetary actions taken to fight inflation and there is the
imperative of resuming a high growth path. Second, the slowdown in growth
due to domestic reasons coincided with the rapid unfolding of the impact
of the global crisis on the Indian economy in the form of reduced capital
flows and the corporates finding it difficult to resort to external
commercial borrowings, as also dampening of export demand. This situation
calls for expanding domestic liquidity. Third, there occurred an acute
deterioration in the fiscal health of the economy which was hidden in
under-provision of expenditures in the original budget of 2008-09 (Govinda
Rao 2009). These uncovered provisions related to pay and pension revisions
as per the sixth pay commission recommendations, additional funds provided
for food and fertilizer subsidies, funding of the loan waiver scheme, and
additional allocations to various flagship programmes including the
national rural employment guarantee (NREG). When the supplementary grants
were sought and finally when revised estimates were presented, it became
clear that the size of gross fiscal deficit had galloped from Rs. 133,287
crore (2.5% of GDP) in 2008-09 (BE) to Rs 326,515 crore (6.0% of GDP) and
significantly, the bulk of this rise in the fiscal deficit - about Rs
105,613 crore out of Rs 193,228 crore - was on account of these uncovered
expenditures, the stimulus packages representing a meagre amount of Rs
40,000 crore or thereabout. In fact, this uncovered expenditure size would
gallop further, if extra-budgetary liabilities created in the form of
special bonds for food, fertilizer and petroleum companies were taken into
account (worth Rs 95,942 crore or 1.8% of GDP during 2008-09).
Table 1: Fiscal
Indicators: Rolling Targets as Percentage of GDP |
|
As per the Budget
2008-09 (February 2008) |
2007-08 |
2008-09 |
Target for |
(RE) |
(BE) |
2009-10 |
2010-11 |
Revenue Deficit |
1.4 |
1.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
Fiscal Deficit |
3.1 |
2.5 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
Gross Tax Revenue |
12.5 |
13.0 |
13.5 |
14.0 |
|
As per the Budget
2009-10(interim) (February 2009) |
2008-09 |
2009-10 |
Target for |
(RE) |
(BE) |
2010-11 |
2011-12 |
Revenue Deficit |
4.4 |
4.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
Fiscal Deficit |
6.0 |
5.5 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
Gross Tax Revenue |
11.6 |
11.1 |
14.4 |
15.0 |
|
As per the Budget
2009-10 (Full) (July 2009) |
2008-09 |
2009-10 |
Target for |
(RE) |
(BE) |
2010-11 |
2011-12 |
Revenue Deficit |
4.4 |
4.8 |
3.0 |
1.5 |
Fiscal Deficit |
6.0 |
6.8 |
5.5 |
4.0 |
Gross Tax Revenue |
11.6 |
10.9 |
11.9 |
12.4 |
Source: Budget Documents (2009-10) |
Finally, all the above
complex developments have occurred when the authorities have been
compelled to seek a radical transformation of the development strategy in
favour of inclusive growth because the benefits of development have
not percolated enough to the poorer sections of society. The entire policy
environment, including that enunciated in the eleventh five-year plan
(2007-08 to 2011-12) and in the Presidential address to the new Parliament
based on the electoral promises of the new government, has imposed an
onerous burden on the Finance Minister to accommodate the programmes and
policies geared towards inclusive growth even as he has faced
tremendous pressures because of (a) vastly reduced revenue receipts, and
(b) higher expenditure commitments as referred to above. The extent of the
revenue losses may be gauged from the differing estimates given of tax
buoyancy (gross tax revenue of the Centres as percentage of GDP) for the
same budget year 2009-10 as well as for the subsequent period 2010-11 and
2011-12 (Table 1). The estimate of gross tax to GDP ratio for the year
2009-10 was 13.5% as projected in the relevant documents of the 2008-09
budget but it was reduced to 11.1% in the interim budget and now it
is placed at 10.9% in the full-year budget for the same year. In these
measurements based on the government’s medium-term projections, the
underlying cause for the decline in tax buoyancy has been the anticipated
slowdown in economic growth.
Excessive Focus on
Conventional Budget Deficit
The intense debate on the
budget has been essentially dominated by the concerns expressed on the
unusually high government borrowings and the consequential increase in the
gross fiscal deficit. But, the environment of reduced tax buoyancy, the
imperatives of not only reverting to a higher growth path but also making
the growth process much more inclusive and the constraints on
liquidity arising from sharply reduced capital inflows from abroad, cannot
but make the authorities accept the reality of a higher fiscal deficit.
This does not mean that the objective of better fiscal prudence has to be
given the go-by. It is just that higher fiscal deficit resorted to now
would help us to achieve fiscal prudence in the medium-term provided
calibrated attempts are made by the RBI to manage liquidity and minimise
any additional average interest cost on the central and state budgets. It
will also help us achieve better growth and thus enhance tax buoyancy.
Table 2: Key
Fiscal Indicators |
(Per cent to GDP) |
Year |
Primary
Deficit |
Revenue
Deficit |
Gross
Fiscal
Deficit |
Outstanding
Liabilities* |
Centre |
2007-08 |
-0.9 |
1.1 |
2.7 |
60.1 |
2008-09 RE |
2.5 |
4.4 |
6.0 |
58.9 |
|
(2.6) |
(4.6) |
(6.2) |
|
2009-10 BE |
3 |
4.8 |
6.8 |
59.7 |
States |
2007-08 # |
-0.6 |
-0.9 |
1.3 |
25.8 |
2008-09 RE # |
0.7 |
-0.2 |
2.5 |
25.2 |
2009-10 BE # |
0.9 |
0.4 |
2.7 |
25.3 |
Combined |
2007-08 |
-1.3 |
0.2 |
4.0 |
73 |
2008-09 RE |
3.4 |
4.4 |
8.6 |
72.6 |
2009-10 BE |
4 |
5.2 |
9.5 |
74.4 |
RE : Revised
Estimates. BE : Budget Estimates
* : Includes
external liabilities at historical exchange rates
# : Data from
2007-08 onwards pertains to 22 State
Governments, of
which 14 are vote on account.
Note:
1. Negative sign indicates surplus
2. Figures in
parentheses relate to provisional accounts |
Source: RBI, First Quarter Review
2009-10, July 27. p.13 |
But, that is not enough. In
order to make the growth process much more egalitarian, it is necessary
for the authorities to undertake a rethinking on the entire structure and
character of fiscal prudence that the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management (FRBM) Act envisages – a worthwhile dynamic strategy which is
missing in the thinking of the government, currently. For instance, if
social deprivations of vast segments of the society have to be reduced,
increased social expenditures have to be promoted at the state as well as
central level and hence too rigid a target on revenue deficit at any level
would be improper (Table 2). Secondly, and more importantly, lessons of
the past decade or so have shown that just targeting deficit indicators
without setting out appropriate goals for the composition of expenditure
and nature of revenue collections, can distort the end results It is known
how focusing on the end products, namely, gross fiscal deficit and revenue
deficit, have resulted in the neglect of the most essential expenditures
for social (Table 3) and physical infrastructure areas. Apart from
ensuring that fiscal policy plays a stabilising role in the economy as it
passes through business cycles with a counter-cyclical stance, it has to
aim at strong developmental and social roles as a rolling strategy in the
medium-term. Even as such strong thrust to a social orientation in public
expenditures is adopted, it is necessary to impart a somewhat improved
degree of egalitarianism in the taxation system of the country.
Table 3:
Social services expenditure
(Centre and State
Governments combined) |
Items |
2003-04 |
2004-05 |
2005-06 |
2006-07 |
2007-08 |
2008-09 |
Actual |
Actual |
Actual |
Actual |
RE |
BE |
Total Expendirute |
796384 |
869757 |
959855 |
1109174 |
1355831 |
1485536 |
Expenditure on Social Services |
153454 |
172812 |
2,02,672 |
239340 |
303490 |
357381 |
of which |
|
|
|
|
|
|
i) Education |
75607 |
84111 |
96365 |
114744 |
135679 |
160642 |
ii) Health |
34066 |
37535 |
45428 |
52126 |
66423 |
75055 |
iii) Others |
43781 |
51166 |
60879 |
72470 |
101388 |
121684 |
As percentage of
GDP |
Total Expendirute |
28.91 |
27.62 |
26.76 |
26.86 |
28.7 |
27.91 |
Expenditure on Social Services |
5.57 |
5.49 |
5.65 |
5.8 |
6.43 |
6.72 |
of which |
|
|
|
|
|
|
i) Education |
2.74 |
2.67 |
2.69 |
2.78 |
2.87 |
3.02 |
ii) Health |
1.24 |
1.19 |
1.27 |
1.26 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
iii) Others |
1.59 |
1.62 |
1.7 |
1.76 |
2.15 |
2.29 |
As percentage of
total expenditure |
Expenditure on Social Services |
19.3 |
19.9 |
21.1 |
21.6 |
22.4 |
24.1 |
of which |
|
|
|
|
|
|
i) Education |
9.5 |
9.7 |
10 |
10.3 |
10 |
10.8 |
ii) Health |
4.3 |
4.3 |
4.7 |
4.7 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
iii) Others |
5.5 |
5.9 |
6.3 |
6.5 |
7.5 |
8.2 |
As percentage of
social services expenditure |
i) Education |
49.3 |
48.7 |
47.5 |
47.9 |
44.7 |
44.9 |
ii) Health |
22.2 |
21.7 |
22.4 |
21.8 |
21.9 |
21 |
iii) Others |
28.5 |
29.6 |
30 |
30.3 |
33.4 |
34 |
Source: Budget Documents of the
Union and State Governments, RBI (Economic Survey 2008-09, page 267) |
An Agenda for Fiscal
Strategy in the Current Context
Perceived in the above
light, there are a number of solutions which come to the surface for the
current situation of the highest ever level of revenue deficit, the
highest primary deficit in India’s post-reform period, and the elevated
levels of the combined gross fiscal deficit of the central and state
governments (RBI 2009). The fresh agenda for the fiscal strategy would
call for presentation of many details, but for the present we describe the
end results of our exercise in this respect rather briefly below:
(i) Raising the marginal
tax rate
The artefacts of India’s
personal tax structure bring out certain glaring revelations. First, India
has emerged as the lowest taxed nation insofar as the middle and higher
income brackets are concerned. For instance, the average incidence of
income tax on assesses having incomes of over Rs.10 lakh has dropped from
45.3% in 1990-91 to 21.4 % in 1999-2000; these data are available up to
1999-2000 only. In fact, tax rate changes effected thereafter do suggest
that the incidence would have further come down in the last eight to nine
years. The marginal tax rate of 30% has been contrary to the
recommendation of the Chelliah Committee Report (GoI 1991-93) which had
suggested a simple three-tier personal income tax structure with a top
rate of 40% (Acharya 2005). It is not our intention to introduce the
upward revision now when the income earners are facing erosion in incomes
due to the current recession; it should nevertheless constitute a part of
the medium-term fiscal strategy.
Secondly, the authorities
have claimed that reductions in tax rates have resulted in better
compliance and improved tax buoyancy – a claim which is not proven
factually. Better buoyancy has come about because there has occurred a
sharp rise in the number of persons earning high incomes, and also quite a
large number of them in the financial sector and in executive categories,
where tax avoidance or evasion becomes difficult. For instance, the number
of people reporting above Rs 10 lakh of assessed income has shot up from
1,564 in 1990-91 to 78,109 in 1990-2000, or in respect of those earning Rs
3 lakh and above, the number has gone up from 16,634 to 527,901 during the
same period; as percentage of total number of assesses, the latter number
has gone up from 1.0 per cent to 7.3 per cent. The increases in exemption
limits may have contributed to the rising share of high-income brackets,
but a rapid rise in their share of assessed incomes proves that it is the
shift of incomes in favour of richer classes that is responsible for the
tax buoyancy. As shown in Table 4, in 1990-91, only 6.6 per cent of income
tax revenue was from the assesses having taxable incomes of over Rs 3 lakh;
this proportion had gone up to 20.8 per cent by 1999-2000. The
contribution of these high-income assesses is brought out more sharply
when we find that their share in personal tax amount assessed has shot up
from 6.2 per cent in 1990-91 to 50.4 per cent in 1999-2000 (As explained
above, these may be partly due to the raising of exemption limits).
Table 4: Income Tax Revenue Statistics: Size Distribution
Part
1:Share of High Income Brackets |
|
Number
of returns |
Range of Income (Rs) |
1999-2000 |
1994-95 |
1990-91 |
3,00,001-4,00,000 |
373129 |
(2.6) |
18116 |
(0.3) |
8465 |
(0.2) |
4,00,001-10,00,000 |
76663 |
(0.5) |
29310 |
(0.4) |
4313 |
(0.1) |
Over 1000000 |
78109 |
(0.5) |
5543 |
(0.1) |
3856 |
(0.1) |
Total of high-income
returns |
527901 |
(3.7) |
52969 |
(0.8) |
16634 |
(0.5) |
Aggregate (including
others) |
14242969 |
(100.0) |
6717453 |
(100.0) |
3525376 |
(100.0) |
|
Income
of returns (Rs Lakh) |
Range of Income (Rs) |
1999-2000 |
1994-95 |
1990-91 |
3,00,001-4,00,000 |
969231 |
(7.7) |
62356 |
(1.5) |
29235 |
(1.9) |
4,00,001-10,00,000 |
502415 |
(4.0) |
207276 |
(4.9) |
35018 |
(2.3) |
Over 1000000 |
1142460 |
(9.1) |
220156 |
(5.2) |
37602 |
(2.4) |
Total of high-income
returns |
2614106 |
(20.8) |
489788 |
(11.5) |
101855 |
(6.6) |
Aggregate (including
others) |
12565976 |
(100.0) |
4247190 |
(100.0) |
1548968 |
(100.0) |
|
Tax
payable (Rs Lakh) |
Range of Income (Rs) |
1999-2000 |
1994-95 |
1990-91 |
3,00,001-4,00,000 |
175187 |
(16.9) |
18286 |
(2.3) |
12481 |
(4.4) |
4,00,001-10,00,000 |
103908 |
(10.0) |
67559 |
(8.7) |
16135 |
(5.7) |
Over 1000000 |
244123 |
(23.5) |
100222 |
(12.8) |
17030 |
(6.0) |
Total of high-income
returns |
523218 |
(50.4) |
186067 |
(23.8) |
45646 |
(16.2) |
Aggregate (including
others) |
1037673 |
(100.0) |
780922 |
(100.0) |
281762 |
(100.0) |
Part 2:
Average Incidence of Income Tax (In Percentages) |
|
Tax
Payable (Rs Lakh) |
|
(As
percentage of income assessed within brackets) |
Range of Income (Rs) |
1999-2000 |
1994-95 |
1990-91 |
3,00,001-4,00,000 |
175187 |
[18.1] |
18286 |
[29.3] |
12481 |
[42.7] |
4,00,001-10,00,000 |
103908 |
[20.7] |
67559 |
[32.6] |
16135 |
[46.1] |
Over 1000000 |
244123 |
[21.4] |
100222 |
[45.5] |
17030 |
[45.3] |
Total of high-income
returns |
523218 |
[20.0] |
186067 |
[38.0] |
45646 |
[44.8] |
Aggregate Tax Payable
(including others) |
1037673 |
|
780922 |
|
281762 |
|
Note: Round brackets
represent percentages to the total; some discrepancies in data have
been observed at source.
Source: GOI
(2003): Indian Public Finance Statistics (2003-04). |
(ii)
Re-imposition of capital gains tax and dividend tax
A blatant aspect of
inegalitariasm in the personal tax structure in the country relates to
abolition of taxes on capital gains in equity and dividend earnings. These
have been severally criticised by many public finance specialists such as
Amaresh Bagchi (2002), Raja Chelliah (2002) and Shankar Acharya (2003).
One statement by Acharya (2005) brings out the severity of criticism in
this respect:
“The current
exclusion of both dividends and long-term capital gains on security
transactions from the base of personal income tax is hard to justify in a
poor country, straining to increase tax revenues. The contrast between
taxation of labour incomes and exemption of returns from equity capital is
stark. Some reform is in order, but it has to be carefully calibrated to
minimize market disruptions” (p.2069).
The recent introduction of new tax measures
such as the fringe benefit tax (FBT), security transactions tax (STT) and
the commodity transactions tax (CTT), have the same egalitarian objective
by mopping up unearned incomes. Hence, the abolition of FBI and CTT in the
latest budget appears to be highly unreasonable and inadvisable
(iii)
Disinvestment of government equities in PSUs
With a careful calibration,
there is scope for generating revenues through partial sales of government
equities held in public sector undertakings (PSUs). But, as per past
practice, the resources so mobilised should not be used for expanding
budgetary resources. Instead, they should be deposited as part of a corpus
for financing special social expenditure schemes beyond the budgeted
programmes, for which there is ample scope. In this regard, the decision
taken in 2000-01 to employ the receipts from disinvestment (and
privatisation) for meeting expenditures on social sectors, restructuring
of central public sector undertakings (CPSUs) and for retiring public
debt, appears a valid one. However, the National Investment Fund
scheme, instituted in November 2005, was somewhat restrictive, in that the
corpus so created will be of a permanent nature and only the annual income
earned on the corpus is to be used for social expenditures and capital
investment in PSUs in the ratio of 3:1. Instead, the funds accumulated in
the corpus may be released after a lapse of every five years for
utilization in social and physical infrastructure programmes in the public
sector, as also for long-term financing requirements of big-size
investment projects in private or public sector or even those operating in
the form of public-private partnerships. In fact, this source of funds may
go to fill the vacuum created in the absence of development finance
institutions (DFIs) in the country, the details of which may have to be
worked out.
(iv) Need for
monetisation of central government borrowings
As the RBI have portrayed,
the net draft on the market resources through central and state government
borrowings has been unprecedented. Such combined net market borrowings
during 2008-09 were nearly two and a half times their net borrowings
during 2007-08, and now, their budgets for 2009-10 have placed such
borrowings higher by as much as 34% over those in 2008-09 (Table 5).
Table 5:
Borrowings of the Central and State Governments: 2009-10 |
(Rs. crore) |
Item |
2009-10 |
2008-09
Actual |
2007-08
Actual |
Interim
Budget
Estimates |
Budget
Estimates
(BE) |
% Increase
in BE over
2008-09 |
Central
Government |
Gross Market
Borrowings $ |
398552 |
491044 |
54.2 |
318550 |
188215 |
Net Market
Borrowings |
308647 |
397957 |
33.3 |
298536 |
108998 |
State Governments |
Net Market
Borrowings |
126000* |
140000* |
34.9 |
103766 |
56224 |
Total Net Market
Borrowings |
434647 |
537957 |
33.7 |
402302 |
165222 |
$ Pertain to
dated securities and 364-Day Treasury Bills. |
* Estimated. The
State Governments have been allowed to borrow an additional
0.5 per cent of
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) as part of the fiscal stimulus
package in
2008-09 and
another 0.5 per cent of GSDP in the Union Budget 2009-10, raising
their budgeted
borrowings in
2009-10 to 4.0 per cent of GSDP. |
Source: Reserve bank of India, First
Quarter Review of Monetary Policy 2009-10 |
Insofar as the central
government borrowings are concerned, the revised borrowing calendar
envisages that net borrowings of Rs 265,911 crore, or two-thirds of the
annual budget of Rs 397,957 crore, will be completed during the first half
of 2009-10 (April-September). The RBI has agreed to purchase government
securities under its open market operations (OMOs) for an indicative
amount of Rs 80,000 crore during the first-half of the current fiscal
year. Both the RBI and the government are wedded to the FRBM regulations
and hence are extremely reluctant to use the term ‘monetisation’ in the
context of the RBI’s special OMOs created essentially for facilitating the
unprecedented levels of government borrowing programmes. As argued in a
recent note, the situation would call for “considerable monetary easing if
the increase in yield rates is to be contained within moderate limits” (EPWRF
2009).
However, there is also a
merit in the argument that the RBI may preserve the monetary weapons in
its armoury for use when growth picks up and the commercial credit
expansion entails further monetary easing. For the extraordinary
government borrowing programme, it is necessary to deploy the facility of
an exceptional character available in the FRBM regulations, that is, in
the form of direct monetisation of government borrowings by the RBI for
such exigencies. If three-fold rise in net market borrowings within a
period of two years by the central and state governments – from Rs 165,222
crore in 2007-08 to Rs 537,957 crore in 2009-10 - is not an extraordinary
situation, what else it is! Also, the reliance on OMOs alone for injecting
liquidity has a serious flaw in that it would provide the unnecessary
leeway for the market for pushing up yield rates on government securities
and thus expanding total interest burden for the budget. The experience of
conducting OMOs in July 2009 when the RBI has had to reject OMO bids shows
the difficulties ahead in using OMOs as a weapon to smoothen the market
for intensified government borrowings. As against a planned OMO borrowing
of Rs 13,500 crore in July 2009, the RBI could achieve only Rs 5,251 crore
because of excessive yield demands by the market. It is significant that
despite there being massive amount of excessive liquidity in the system,
the central as well as state government borrowings have been conducted at
substantially higher yield rates than in the previous year.
Finally, the reported
enthusiasm on the part of the Union Finance Ministry to establish a Debt
Management Office (DMO) in the government so as to achieve separation of
monetary and debt management functions, is somewhat misplaced,
particularly in the current context of the RBI having to support the
government borrowing programme to an unusual extent which may persist for
the next two to three years. As it is, the RBI has been exercising its
operational independence within the given socio-economic constraints. The
notion of the above functional separation between monetary and fiscal
policies itself arises from the conventional monetarist stance of
inflation control by monetary policy. In India, inflation is primarily
determined by supply factors and also by many social influences of income
distribution, etc. Even the generation of money balances is influenced by
real growth factors except during the past few years when external capital
flows have generated explosive growth of domestic liquidity for which
again, close coordination was possible between the government and the RBI
to achieve an innovative sterilisation arrangement within the current
dispensation, or what Dr.Y.V. Reddy (2009) called “………in the nature of
creative tensions, with a notable beneficial impact on the economy”(emphasis
added).
* This note has been contributed by Dr. S.
L. Shetty
References
Acharya, Shankar (2003): India’s Economy:
Some Issues and Answers, Academic Foundation,
New Delhi.
- (2005): ‘Thirty Years of Tax Reform in
India’, Economic and Political Weekly, May 14.
Bagchi, Amaresh (2002): ‘Vision of the Kelkar
Papers: A Critique’, Economic and Political
Weekly, December 21.
GoI (1991-93): Reports of the Reports of the
Tax Reform Committee (Chairman: Raja Chelliah)
Rao, M Govinda (2003): ‘Reform in the Central
Sales Tax in the Context of VAT’, Economic
and Political Weekly, February 15.
-(2009): ‘The Fiscal Situation and a Reform
Agenda for the New Government’, Economic and
Political Weekly, June 20.
RBI (2009): Macroeconomic and Monetary
Developments First Quarter Review 2009-10,
July 27.